Orwell, Stalin's World, and Putin's Russia: Masha Karp's *George Orwell and Russia*

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Long before Vladimir Putin's efforts to transform Ukraine into Room 101, George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *1984* became very popular in post-communist Russia. Between 2010 and 2019, *1984* sold 1.8 million copies, emerging as one of the decade's best-sellers. It even reached Russia's Top-Ten list in 2015, a year after Moscow annexed Ukraine's Crimean peninsula following its Revolution of Dignity. The novel attracted even more readers after the February 2022 invasion, becoming in 2023 not only one of the most purchased books from Russia's largest book chain Chitai-Gorod, but also its most stolen title.[1]

Why is Orwell so popular in Russia? How did he, who never set foot in Russia, acquire such popularity nearly seventy-five years after his death? How, when, and why did he—an unaffiliated socialist—embrace a critical stance toward the Soviet Union, the world's first self-proclaimed workers' state?

In this superb, highly nuanced book, Masha Karp—the former Russian Features editor at the BBC World Service—explains why. Inspired by her own first reading of a samizdat version of *1984* in Leningrad fifty years ago, she sheds light on these unexplored topics in this highly sophisticated and well-argued book, which contains two parts, each with a different trajectory.

The first part (chapters 1-7) provides a thorough investigation of the evolution Orwell's engagement with "Russia" (as the USSR was widely and incorrectly called in the West at the time). Based on extensive research in the relevant archives and libraries in Great Britain, the US and Russia (including the Orwell materials at RGASPI), she successfully frames Orwell's political formation within a turbulent world disillusioned by the outcome of the Great War.

These chapters present a richly detailed account of Eric Blair's transformation into George Orwell, an anti-imperialist, anti-fascist, and anti-Stalinist icon. In mapping his political journey, Karp does not discuss his personal flaws and contradictions, homophobia, occasional anti-Semitism, sexism, or complex relationship with Eileen O'Shaughnessy Blair, his first wife, who helped hone his last two novels into international bestsellers.[2] Instead, Karp concentrates on how Orwell defined his version of "democratic socialism" in the shadow of Stalin's new order.

Most importantly, this monograph investigates how Orwell's major life events, political readings, and meetings -- many unfamiliar to most readers of this journal—helped form his view of the world.[3] Karp deftly describes and analyzes his early Anglo-Indian environment, his youth at Eton, his naïve admiration of Lenin's revolution, and his hatred of British imperialism after his service in the Indian Imperial police in Burma. She also probes his fascination with the Soviet experiment when he lived in Paris (1928-29), financially supported by his maternal aunt, Elaine Kate "Nellie" Limouzin, who followed her partner Eugene Lanti in embracing communism and the Esperanto movement. Despite privately voicing some sympathy for the USSR, Blair did not publish any clearly defined political views concerning Russia, Lenin, the Soviet Union, or Stalin until 1938.[4]

Only after his return to England in 1929 did he slowly drift toward socialism. Equally opposed to class-ridden capitalist democracies as well as to fascism, Blair's contrarian nature, his sympathy with the downtrodden of the world, and empathy for the underdog prepared the way. He believed that "people should have a fair deal in life" (as expressed by Brenda Salkeld, one of Orwell's old friends cited in Karp, 36). Although he did join the Independent Labor Party (ILP) in 1938, he objected to their pacifism after Great Britain declared war on Germany in September 1939. Remaining a socialist, he did not align himself with any one political grouping afterwards.[5]

As Karp reveals, Orwell's political vision contained complex and contradictory components. His socialism embraced aspects of four different political orientations: anarchism (which stressed individual rights), socialism (which emphasized the redistribution of wealth and central planning), representative democracy (which guaranteed civil liberties and the rule of law), and English patriotism. Opposed to all the "smelly little orthodoxies which are now contending for our souls," his socialism remained personal and idiosyncratic—not state-centered.[6] As Karp emphasizes, Orwell's "democratic socialism" remained a work in progress throughout the 1930s and 1940s.

Most importantly, even as an unaffiliated socialist and outsider, he had to define his relationship with the USSR. Between 1928 and 1936, Orwell learned about the mass arrests, executions, deportations, starvation (especially the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine), and general impoverishment generated by Stalin's first Five-year plans from Lanti and from the very few critical accounts published in the British press.[7] Whatever his private doubts about the "progressive" nature of Soviet policies in this period, Karp does not explain why he did not openly criticize the USSR before his departure for Spain.

Six months after his marriage to O'Shaughnessy in June 1936, the newlyweds moved to Barcelona in order to defend the Loyalist cause and to fight fascism. Unaware of the complexity of Spain's internal politics or of the fragile pro-Republican coalition of socialists, anarchists, and communists, Orwell joined the ILP-affiliated anarchist-socialist pro-Trotskyist Partido de Unificación Marxista (POUM) militia at the Aragon Front, not the communist-controlled International Brigades near Madrid. By June 1937, he became enmeshed in the "war within the civil war" as the Spanish communists grabbed control of the Soviet-backed Republican

government, detained POUM leaders, and suppressed its noncommunist militias. Narrowly avoiding arrest, Orwell and his wife fled Spain in late June.

Returning to England, he learned that British press coverage completely misrepresented the communist putsch in Spain and sided with the "progressive" government that crushed his comrades-in-arms. Perceiving the pervasiveness of the "poisonous effect of the Russian *mythos* on English intellectual life," Orwell now sought to expose the Soviet regime "for what it was," a country which had abandoned its socialist ideals, re-established social hierarchies, and now defended Russian state interests, not those of the working class.[8]

In his 1946 essay, "Why I Write," George Orwell claimed that his experiences during the Spanish Civil War provided him with a political focus. "Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, *against* totalitarianism and *for* democratic socialism, as I understand it," he asserted.[9] As Karp reminds us, he qualified the word "socialism" twice in this sentence: "*democratic socialism, as I understand it*." He identified himself as a man of the left, but was "obviously unwilling to be seen as a supporter of the socialism to which he did not subscribe" (196).

He distinguished his socialism from that practiced in totalitarian states, "governed by one-party dictatorship which does not permit legal opposition and crushes freedom of speech and the press."[10] However controversial his definition, he was horrified by the possibility that the political systems pioneered by Italy, Germany, and the USSR might attract the British masses, transforming freedom of thought into a "deadly sin" and later into "a meaningless abstraction."[11]

Seeking to warn his compatriots, Orwell's memoir *Homage to Catalonia* (1938) failed to find a large audience, much less influence his comrades on the left, who believed that the USSR—even if not the paragon of socialism—represented the only bulwark against fascism and

Hitler's expansionism. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact may have shocked many who believed in the Soviet cause, but only for twenty-two months. Hitler's surprise invasion in June 1941 rallied not only those on the left, but also Churchill's Conservative government, which allied itself with the Soviet Union.

During the Second World War, the British public—saturated with pro-Soviet propaganda endorsed by the authorities (and supervised by Peter Smollet, the Head of Soviet Relations at the Ministry of Information and an agent of the NKVD recruited by Kim Philby)—remained unaware of the rising tensions between the US and the United Kingdom on one side and the USSR – on the other. Living in this environment, Orwell understood the challenge in persuading his readers. In his preface to the Ukrainian translation of *Animal Farm* (the only preface he wrote for any of his translations before his death in 1950), he wrote that England

> is not completely democratic. It is a capitalist country with great class privileges (even now, after a war which has tended to equalize everybody) with great differences in wealth. But nevertheless, it is a country in which people have lived together for several hundred years without major conflict, in which the laws are relatively just and official news and statistics can almost invariably be believed, and—last but not least—in which to hold and voice minority views does not involve any mortal danger. In such an atmosphere, the man in the street has no real understanding of things like concentration camps, mass deportations, arrests without trial, press censorship, etc. Everything he reads about a country like the USSR is automatically translated into English terms, and he quite innocently accepts the lies of totalitarian propaganda. Up to 1939, and even later, the majority of English people were incapable of assessing the true nature of the Nazi regime in Germany, and now, with the Soviet regime, they are still to a large extent under the same sort of illusion.[12]

Orwell never claimed to be a political prophet. In defending *1984* shortly after its publication, he asserted that it is "not intended as an attack on socialism, or on the British Labor Party (of which I am a supporter) but as a show-up of the perversions to which a centralized economy is liable and which have already been partly realized in Communism and Fascism. I do not believe that the kind of society I described necessarily will arrive, but I believe (allowing of course for the fact that the book is a satire) that something resembling it could arrive . . . The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasize that the English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, *if not fought against,* could triumph anywhere."[13] What is the lesson the nightmarish world of *1984* provides us? As Fredric J. Warburg, Orwell's publisher, claimed: "Don't let it happen. It depends on you."[14]

With O'Shaughnessy Blair's input, Orwell transformed the Soviet excesses of the 1920s and 1930s into postwar English terms and recognizable settings (the farm and destroyed urban areas). At the start of the Cold War, those politically committed (whether on the right or left) might understand his allusions to events ripped from the Soviet headlines. But most Britons wanted to learn why the Cold War started, why the victorious alliance fell apart, and what the USSR represented. Like all successful dystopian novelists, Orwell made the foreign, familiar and at the same time made the familiar, foreign and provided a plausible explanation.

With the publication of *Animal Farm* (1945) shortly after the Potsdam Conference, Orwell attracted another set of readers. Unlike his previous books, his last two novels appealed to readers not only in the Anglo-American world but also to East European émigrés, political refugees and displaced persons who arrived in Germany before and during the Second World War.

In implementing the Yalta's repatriation policies, members of the British and American occupational forces in Germany did not understand why many of these men and women refused to return to the USSR and forcibly sent many of them back. Many committed suicide.[15] The refugees who remained in the Western zones felt betrayed by the British and the Americans. Having met several of those displaced when he visited liberated Germany in early 1945, Orwell understood their fears and openly sympathized with them.

If the first part of Karp's book concentrated on Orwell's political pilgrimage, the second part (chapters 8-10) concentrates on Orwell's post-war reception by Russian émigrés, by Ukrainian and Polish displaced persons in the Allied occupational zones of Germany, as well as his subsequent reception in the USSR and in post-communist Russia. Here, Karp shows how millions who fled communism or lived behind the Iron Curtain saw Orwell as a writer who could envision the physical and psychological pressures communist states could impose on them.

Karp masterfully narrates the circumstances under which the first émigré translations of *Animal Farm* appeared in Polish (1946), Ukrainian (1947), and Russian (1949-1950). Émigré representatives from these groups—not MI6 or the OSS/CIA—initiated these projects. Teresa Jeleńska faithfully translated the novel into Polish, without any cuts. With Orwell's approval, Ihor Ševčenko, the Ukrainian translator, edited his preface (not the text), making it comprehensible to his future readers, who knew nothing about the author.

But as Karp points out, Gleb Struve's Russian version actually deleted passages from Orwell's text (Karp, 213-216), especially those that implied that the officially-approved Russian Orthodox Church's worked closely with the Soviet regime in manipulating the political attitudes of religious believers. The Raven's role in *Animal Farm* offended the publisher of *Posev*, Vladimir Gorachek, a younger member of the White emigration, one of the founders of NTS (National

Alliance of Russian Solidarists), and a staunch Russian Orthodox believer.[16] Before his death on January 21, 1950, Orwell never learned of Struve's censorship.

In her discussion of these translations, Karp might have mentioned how the groups supporting the Polish and Ukrainian translations differed politically from the *Posev* group, fellow anti-communists. The Poles and Ukrainians understood that the Stalinist regime in the 1930s had reimposed not only social hierarchies, but national ones as well.[17] For Stalin, the "Great Patriotic War" represented a Russian victory as well as a Soviet one. The establishment of Peoples' Republics in East Central Europe after 1945 only re-affirmed that in the new socialist bloc, all nations were equal but some nations were more equal than others. Although anti-communist in orientation, the *Posev* group sought to restore the Russian Empire and applauded Stalin's expansion. The Poles and Ukrainians did not. Orwell, a staunch anti-imperialist, appears to have been unaware of the dissonant undercurrents among his Slavic translators.

Karp also introduces the reader to the various Russian émigré organizations funded by the CIA that smuggled Orwell's books and other banned Russian and Western classics into the USSR, how the Soviet authorities publicly attacked *Animal Farm* and *1984*, the various samizdat editions of these novels, and their "special editions" (limited to 100-200 copies) the Communist Party leadership distributed to its inner circle. Only in 1988 did the authorities officially publish *Animal Farm* and *1984* for the first time in the USSR in the Russian language, but not in Moscow or Leningrad (the first appeared in Latvia; the second in Moldova).

Much like Karp decades ago, Soviet and East European readers recognized that Winston Smith's life in Oceania had "an uncanny resemblance to their own." They "identified with the secret interior of an individual under an oppressive regime" (233- 34), which can destroy "human beings, not necessarily by killing them" (242).

These interpretations fuel Orwell's popularity in Russia today. According to Karp, millions of Russians believe that Putin's oppressive regime has transformed post-Soviet Russia into an "aggressive totalitarian state" -- similar but not identical with the Soviet Union (259). Embracing Orwell's definition of totalitarianism, she asserts that:

> Putin's Russia had been moving toward totalitarianism for years, but the invasion of Ukraine triggered the endgame, and within days the country displayed an even stronger resemblance to the absurd totalitarian monster described by Orwell . . . The word 'war' was instantly banned and ordered to be replaced, on pain of prosecution, by the phrase 'a special military operation.' (249)

Although she concentrates on the similarities, Karp does not explain the differences between the totalitarianism of the past (and which past? The late Stalin period? The post-Stalin period?) and Putin's present. How and in what ways do they diverge? Inspired by the author, these questions raise other questions -- and not just for scholars, but also for Orwell's adherents in Russia.

Four years after the start of Putin's full-scale war against Ukraine, what are the prospects for a more democratic Russian future? If one does not emigrate, how much should individuals opposed to Putin's policies invest in changing Russia? Most importantly, how should these men and women respond to the brutal crackdown against peaceful anti-war demonstrations after February 24, 2022, the Central Election Commission's ban of anti-war candidate Boris Nadezhdin from standing in Russia's presidential election on February 9, 2024, and Alexei Navalny's death on February 16, 2024?

Orwell's last novels depicted the Stalinist world, which—infused with a "mobilizational ideology"—implemented collectivization and industrialization at "unprecedented scale and

speed" and sought—by means of mass terror—to remake man in the image and likeness of an idealized Soviet man. But Putin has embraced a more sophisticated approach.[18] Since 1999, his political team has created a new state mythology and justified an aggressive foreign policy by appealing to past grievances and to manipulated historical memories. By wresting control of the economy from the oligarchs, by reimagining the Great Patriotic War as a manifestation of national unity conducive to his agenda, and by annexing Crimea, Putin has generated broad public support. His repressions of his political opponents, however reprehensible, have been small and targeted. By encouraging "ritualistic patriotism" and "political apathy," he has politically demobilized the country.[19]

Even if most of Russia's citizens have absorbed only aspects of the state propaganda to varying degrees, the skewed interpretations dispensed by Kremlin-controlled media outlets over the past decades have fallen on fertile ground in a society scarred by the internal chaos and international humiliations of the 1990s. After the collapse of the USSR, many Russian citizens sought political leaders who promised certainty, delivered a semblance of stability, and devoted themselves to the cause of restoring Russia's status as a great power. Putin fit the bill.

After twenty-five years in charge, Putin has defined how most Russians see the world, Russia's place in it, and his indispensability in restoring Russia to its great power status. Two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, nearly seventy-five percent of those polled by the Levada Center still actively and passively support Putin and his "special military operation" there. Even if many respondents to these polls may not have answered honestly, most Russians equate Putin's political interests with the interests of the state and tend to support the war, especially if it does not directly impact them.[20]

In the same polls, approximately twenty percent of Russia's voters have consistently admitted an anti-war position, coinciding with those who have unfailingly opposed the Putin regime. Predominantly young, urban, female, and internet-savvy, they understand that they are a minority. Only a far smaller subset of this group has openly demonstrated against the war or fled abroad in protest. They may have acquired Orwell's ability "to see things as they are" (204), but they do not *necessarily* recognize this brutal war for what is: an imperial intervention into a neighboring state and the first major anti-colonial struggle of the twenty-first century.[21]

The regime's long-term degradation of democratic institutions, polarization, anti-Westernism, and the decline of trust have set the stage. The Russian president's repressions since 2011 (and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine) have only reinforced the isolation of his critics and promoted public conformity.

When protests have become dangerous and futile, what is to be done? To an outside observer, Putin's opponents appear silent and uncertain on how they might resist within their limited means. The pressures to stop criticizing the regime and to embrace apathy are unrelenting. Most of Russia's citizens want to concentrate on their own lives, not engage in "small deeds" that may undermine Putin's façade.

Dictatorships do not just destroy the public sphere, they also undermine the private one. But if Putin's opponents perceive their Russia as totalitarian as Orwell's Oceania, may they not also conclude that Putin's victory over his opponents is inevitable, not unlike Big Brother's final victory over Winston Smith? And do nothing?

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Notes

[1] *The Moscow Times*, May 26, 2022 and December 27, 2023.

[2] Orwell's complex relationships with women, see Sylvia Topp, *Eileen: The Making of George Orwell* (New York: Unbound, 2020); Anna Funder, *Wifedom: Mrs. Orwell's Invisible Life* (New York: Knopf, 2023); Eileen M. Hunt, "Feminism vs. Big Brother," *Literary Review*, October 2023: 15-16; and Richard Brooks, "Sadistic and misogynistic? Row erupts over sex claims in book about Orwell's marriage," *The Guardian*, November 11, 2023. Also see Eileen M. Hunt's forthcoming *The Women Who Made Orwell*.

[3] Karp masterfully describes Orwell's inspiration for "2+2=5" (107-109), explains how he was one of the first to coin the term "Cold War" (155-6), and provides a context to Orwell's "Black List" of "crypto-communists and fellow-travelers" he provided to a friend who worked at the Information Research Department, which aimed to counter Soviet propaganda (176-187). But the author does not describe O'Shaughnessy Blair's inspiration for Orwell's title for *1984*, which was originally, "the Last Man in Europe" (see Topp and Funder).

[4] See Orwell's writings and documents concerning him from 1903 to 1938 in George Orwell, *Collected Works*, edited by Peter Davison (London: Secker and Warburg, 1998), vol. 10 and 11 (cited hereafter as *CW*). Following the publication of his *Homage to Catalonia* in April 1938, Orwell reviewed Eugene Lyons' *Assignment in Utopia*, *New English Weekly*, June 9, 1938; *CW*, vol. 11, 158-160 and Franz Borkenau's *The Communist International, New English Weekly*, September 22, 1938; *CW*, vol. 11, 202-204.

[5] See Orwell, "Why I joined the ILP," *The New Leader*, June 24, 1938; *The Collected Works of George Orwell*, ed. by Peter Davison (London: Secker and Warburg, 1998), vol. 11, 167-69 (cited hereafter as *CW*); Orwell, *Essays*, selected and introduced by John Carey (New York and London: Everyman's Library [Alfred A. Knopf, 2002]), 91-3.

[6] The phrase comes from Orwell, "Charles Dickens (March 11, 1940)," G. Orwell, *A Collection of Essays* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1981), 104; *CW*, vol. 11, 56.

[7] In his preface to the Ukrainian translation of *Animal Farm*, written in March 1947, Orwell asserted that "Since 1930, I have seen little evidence that the USSR was progressing towards anything that one could truly call socialism. I was struck by clear signs of its transformation into a hierarchical society, in which the rulers have no more reason to give up power than any other ruling class." Orwell, "Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of *Animal Farm*," CW, vol. 19, 87-88; Orwell, *Essays* (2002), 1210. Inasmuch as most human beings try to present themselves in the best possible light,

Orwell may have pushed back the moment he realized the enormity of Stalin's crimes and their implications for socialism.

[8] Orwell wrote: "One can accept, and most enlightened people would accept, the Communist thesis that pure freedom will only exist in a classless society, and that one is not nearly free when one is working to bring about such a society. But slipped in with this is the quite unfounded claim that the Communist Party is itself aiming at the establishment of a classless society, and that in the U.S.S.R. this aim is actually on the way to being realized." George Orwell, "The Prevention of Literature," *The Atlantic*, March 1947, p. 2; *CW,* vol. 17, 372.

[9] Orwell, "Why I Write (1946)," *CW*, vol. 18, 319; *Essays* (2002), 1083-4.

[10] Orwell's Notes to Randall Swingler's "The Right of Free Expression," *CW*, vol. 18, 442. See Orwell's analysis of the totalitarian state in his essay, "Prevention of Literature," *CW*, vol. 17, 369-381.

[11] Orwell, "Inside the Whale (March 11, 1940)," *CW*, vol. 12, 110.

[12] Orwell, "Preface to the Ukrainian Edition of *Animal Farm*," CW, vol. 19, 88; Orwell, *Essays* (2002), 1213.

[13] Orwell's Letter to the Editor, *The Socialist Call* (New York), July 22, 1949; *CW*, vol. 20, 136 (Orwell's emphasis).

[14] Comments by F.J.W. (Fredric J. Warburg) in "Orwell's Statement on Nineteen Eighty-four," *CW*, vol. 20, 134.

[15] On the repatriation of Soviet citizens after the war, see Julius Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1943 to the present* (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1973); Nicholas Bethell, *The Last Secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia, 1944-7* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974; Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London: Holder and Stoughton, 1977); Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Secret Betrayal* (New York: Scribner, 1977); Mark Elliot, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Minister and the Massacres* (London: Century Hutchinson, 1986); Marta Dyczok, *The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Andrea Chalupa, *Orwell and the Refugees: The Untold Story of Animal Farm* (Amazon Digital Services, 2012); Nikolai Tolstoy, *Stalin's Vengence:The Final Truth About the Forced Return of Russians After World War 2* (Washington, DC: Academia Press, 2021). Also see Ksenya Kiebuzinski, "Not Lost in Translation: Orwell's Animal Farm Among the Refugees and Beyond the Iron Curtain," *The Halycon: Newsletter of the Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library* (University of Toronto), vol. 59, (June 2017), 1-5.

[16] Julius Telesin translated the censored parts into Russian in 1982 and published them in *Kontinent*. See Julius Telesin, "Pismo v redaktsiiu," *Kontinent*, 1982, no. 34, 365-7 (http://www.laban.rs./orwell/animal-farm/Perevod_fragmentov_YT.html [cited in Karp, 213]).

[17] According to Louis Fischer, the United Press International (UPI) correspondent in Moscow from 1928-1934, the Stalinist regime's new historical interpretations established in 1934 contradicted its full commitment to the anti-imperialist cause inside and outside Soviet borders: "Having destroyed the vision of the future, the dictatorship had no choice but to turn its back on the future and embrace the past. That was the essence of the nationalist 'line' adopted by the Kremlin in 1934. The Nazi revolution began with the glorification of Germany's past. The Bolshevik Revolution ended when it glorified Russia's past. Russia had a great past and its heroes were anti-Czarist rebels. The new phase, however, celebrated not the rebels but the Czars" (214). See Fischer's essay in *The God That Failed*, ed. by Richard Crossman, with a new forward by David C. Engerman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001 [1950]), 196-228. For important analyses of the interplay between Soviet nationalities policies and the "Russia first" policies (which Orwell observed in Spain), see Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001) and David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism and the Formation of the Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

[18] Jade McGLynn, "The Real Story behind Russia's New 'Stalin Centers'," www.cnn.com, January 20, 2024.

[19] Jade McGlynn, *Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin's Russia* (New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); and *Russia's War* (London: Polity, 2023).

[20] Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov, "Alternate Reality: How Russian Society Learned to Stop Worrying About the War," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 28, 2023; and Robyn Dixon, "Most Russians back war in Ukraine and buy Putin's case for it," *The Washington Post*, November 28, 2023. For a different interpretation, see Vladimir Milov, "How strong is Russian public support for the invasion of Ukraine?, UkraineAlert/Eurasia Center, The Atlantic Council, January 9, 2024 [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/ ukrainealert/how-strong-is-russian-support-for-the-invasion-of-ukraine-2/] and Amy Knight, "In Russia, an antiwar movement is taking shape," *The Washington Post*, February 6, 2024. For preference falsification, see Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

[21] For reasons why they oppose the war, see Figures and 2 and 3, Volkov and Kolesnikov.